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I sketch a line of thought about consciousness and physics that gives some motivation for the
hypothesis that conscious observers deviate – perhaps only very subtly and slightly – from quantum
dynamics. Although it is hard to know just how much credence to give this line of thought, it
does add motivation for a stronger and more comprehensive programme of quantum experiments
involving quantum observers.
INTRODUCTION
I describe below my current stances on consciousness and its relationship to physics, which have been strongly
influenced in particular by James [1]. Briefly, I am among those persuaded that there is a hard problem of conscious-
ness, and that in Chalmers’ terms it appears to be strongly emergent [2] from, or in other words inexplicable by, the
currently understood laws of physics. This means I reject the counter-view that consciousness is a weakly emergent
consequence of brain activity – that is, a consequence that may initially seem surprising but in principle is entirely
explicable by aspects of neuroscience that are reducible to known physical facts and laws.
One strong reason for doing so is that a complete scientific model of consciousness appears to require, among other
things, some sort of data selection principle, characterising the subset of information about material substrates of
consciousness (such as our brains) that has correlates in conscious states (such as our conscious minds). The known
laws of physics are not of a type that allows any such principle to be derived. I enlarge on this below. Another way of
framing the essential point is the conceivability argument for the logical possibility of a consciousness-free universe,
materially identical to ours and following the same known laws of physics, but inhabited by “philosophical zombies”
[3, 4] who act as we do but are aware of nothing; I find this equally persuasive. A further compelling argument is the
knowledge argument [5, 6]: someone can have knowledge of all the known facts about and laws governing the material
world and yet, in the absence of first-hand experience, not know what particular types of experience are like.
The scale of the explanatory gap between the known laws of physics and conscious experience seems most evident
to me when we take a cosmological perspective and consider consciousness in the context of Darwinian evolution.
Our consciousnesses seem very well designed to maximize our survival chances; they also seem designed to allow us
to report and discuss our conscious states with others. None of this appears explicable by the known laws of physics
[1, 7].
Of course, these positions are all highly debatable and have been criticised and defended by many. ( See e.g.
Refs. [2, 4–12] and references therein for some expositions and reviews.) My goal here is not to make new cases for
them. Nor do I want to suggest that they necessarily imply that there must be new physical laws explaining every
aspect of consciousness. Consciousness poses formidable problems for physics, including explaining the brute fact
of its existence, qualitative and quantitative aspects of conscious experience, the relationship between consciousness
and matter, the evolutionary or cosmological origins of consciousness, and the evolution of human consciousness from
some presumably primitive form. It is not clear that any of the standard positions on consciousness (e.g. [3, 13])
is necessarily the right starting point for resolving all these problems, nor does it seem realistic to expect any new
proposal to tackle them all at once.
This leaves a risk of succumbing to a form of learned[46] helplessness, given a voluminous literature in which
every plausible argument is opposed by plausible counterarguments and every interesting position has potentially
insurmountable difficulties. A better alternative than intellectual paralysis may be to accept our present framings of
the problems may be conceptually inadequate and to look for lines of thought that might suggest different ways of
thinking about the relationship between physics (as presently understood) and consciousness.
I suggest here that, in particular, current developments in the foundations of physics could suggest possible ways
of acquiring new empirical evidence about the relationship between physics and consciousness. First, I will sketch in
a bit more detail the stances summarised above, and then try to say something about their potential implications for
quantum theory and experimental tests involving conscious observers.
1. Consciousness – the collection of perceptions, sensations, thoughts, emotions, thoughts about perceptions, and
2so on, that we experience – is a natural phenomenon. We say something about the world when we say that we
are conscious, just as we do when we say that the Earth is roughly round and that solid objects tend to fall
towards it. Saying that an individual’s brain runs algorithms that include models of the individual, or that their
body tends to respond in a relatively predictable way to stimuli, also says something about the world – but it
does not say or logically imply anything about their consciousness, including its existence.
2. One of the main goals of physics is to give compressed descriptions of natural phenomena.[47] Physical laws
reduce a very large set of data to a much smaller set. For example, Newton’s laws of gravity and of motion
not only characterise and quantify how and when solid objects fall towards the Earth, but give us a unified
description that includes the large-scale behaviour of liquids and gases, the motion of celestial and terrestrial
bodies, and laws governing tides and atmospheres. So it is a reasonable ambition for physics to look for a
compressed, lawlike description of consciousness.
3. The only certain examples we have, our brains and nervous systems, suggest that consciousness is intimately
bound up with the properties of matter. So a reasonable ansatz, or starting point, for a lawlike description of
consciousness would be a relatively compressed set of rules from which we can infer that when a physical system
is in state S its consciousness is in state C(S). We certainly want to allow that C(S) may be empty, since we
don’t want to assume that every physical system is conscious.[48] We should also allow for the possibility of
a physical system having more than one separate consciousness, since a human family or a city appear to be
examples, and perhaps even a single human or animal brain can be. So really we should say “its consciousness
is in state C(S), or its consciousnesses are in states Ci(S) for a list i in some index set I(S)”. For brevity we
leave this implicit below.
4. By the admittedly high standards of successful laws of physics, we don’t have any remotely satisfactory lawlike
description of consciousness. We can say the waking human brain is generally conscious, and that specific types
of consciousness – visual imagery, or smell, or formulating speech – are associated with activities in various
regions of the brain (generally many such regions for any given activity). These seem like raw observational
data that any theory should aim to explain. Perhaps, more charitably, they could also be seen as steps towards
high level laws in a high level description, which should eventually be superseded by more fundamental laws. In
physical terms they seem roughly comparable to the observations that stones fall to the ground, birds go up in
the air when they flap their wings hard and clouds tend to float around in the sky. That is, they are generally
true, though slightly vague, statements about quite complex physical systems. The history of physics encourages
us to try to describe the underlying phenomena better – more completely, more simply, more precisely – by
formulating simple and precise mathematical laws governing a smaller range of more elementary objects or
quantities.[49]
5. The sort of law suggested so far is consistent with consciousness being an epiphenomenon [7, 12], that is, having
physical causes or correlates but no effects on the material world. Suppose that the laws of physics are complete,
or complete enough to describe physics in many regimes, including the behaviour of matter on Earth. Or at
least that they are completable, in the sense that there is an as yet undiscovered unified theory T of the sort
physicists conventionally imagine. That is, one that includes quantum theory and gravity, and fully describes
the dynamics of matter, fields and spacetime, perhaps also including a theory of initial conditions and/or other
constraints – but which makes no reference to consciousness. And suppose, just to simplify the language of the
discussion, that T allows a sort of effective reductionism in many contexts, so that with appropriate modelling,
which in principle can be justified from the fundamental principles of T , we can describe physical systems S
interacting with their environment E(S), modelled in a way derived from the laws of physics encapsulated in T .
In shorthand, we say such systems S follow the laws of physics given by T . Now, some of these physical systems
S – human brains, for example – have associated non-empty consciousnesses C(S). But by (conventional)
hypothesis, S follows the laws of physics given by T whatever the form of its consciousness C(S). We don’t need
to know anything about C(S) to predict the physical behaviour of S, or any of its physical properties (other
than those of C(S) itself). Indeed, we don’t even need to be aware of the phenomenon of consciousness in order
to predict the physical behaviour of S.
On the view given so far, then, a complete understanding of the physics of S involves understanding T , deriving
the predictions that T makes for S, and then adding, as an extra interesting detail, that S has a particular
(maybe empty) form of consciousness C(S). This detail is generally time-dependent, our experiences tell us: as
the physical state of S changes over time, the consciousness C(S) generally also changes.[50]
36. However, if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, and its epiphenomenal association with the material world is
described by simple laws, then it is very hard to understand how and why we evolved to have rich consciousnesses
that contain a great deal of data highly relevant to our survival. Darwinian evolution takes place in the material
physical world. If consciousness hitches a free ride on that world, then there is no particular need a priori for
evolutionarily successful creatures to be conscious. [1] Even if they are, there is no need for their consciousnesses
to contain data relevant to survival. We could equally well be agilely escaping a tiger while conscious of nothing,
or aware only of the fermion numbers of our patellae, or any other physical variables associated with our
material selves. On the epiphenomenal view of consciousness, the laws of physics encoded in T are all that is
relevant to our body and brain functions during the escape; they are also all that is relevant to describing the
evolution of those body and brain functions over aeons that include successful and tragic encounters with tigers
by earlier generations. All that we need to explain our evolved traits is that our direct ancestors tended to be
over-represented in the successful encounters (et cetera).
7. It is also very hard to understand how, if consciousness is purely an epiphenomenon, we can talk about the
contents of our conscious minds, listen to ourselves doing so, and feel that we accurately represented ourselves.
[14]
8. As if these problems for the epiphenomenal view of consciousness were not devastating enough, they can be
sharpened further. [1] Not only do our consciousnesses contain a great deal of information about the world
relevant to our survival, but the information is associated with qualitative types of experience that seem designed
to encourage evolutionarily advantageous behaviour. It seems to be logically possible, and arguably even natural,
to think of epiphenomenal consciousnesses as value neutral – simply registering aspects of the exterior and interior
world without associating any form of judgement on them. Indeed, some aspects of our own consciousnesses
seem to be close to neutral. For example, we feel that many – though by no means all – visual images give us data
without associating much aversion or attraction. However highly pleasant and unpleasant sensations, pleasures
and pains, play very significant roles in our conscious lives. Moreover, these roles seem to be important to our
survival. By and large, the pleasures seem associated with evolutionarily advantageous activities (food, drink,
friendship, bonding, raising of status, sex, . . .), and the pains with disadvantageous ones (raging thirst, injury,
lowering of status, rejection, . . .). Yet, on an epiphenomenal view, there seems no possibility of an evolutionary
explanation for these correlations. Evolution of our material selves explains that the laws of physics encoded in T
caused our brains and bodies to tend to seek out evolutionary advantageous activities and avoid disadvantageous
ones. It does not then matter whether our epiphenomenal consciousnesses find the former pleasurable and the
latter painful, or vice versa.
9. So, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon.[51]
BACKWARD OR ONWARD?
At this point, one really needs to pause and take a breath, because the terrain is not going to become easier if one
presses further. Following the logic of the argument so far, there should be a physical theory of consciousness, but it
should not be an epiphenomenal theory. But are there any other coherent options? And even if there might possibly
be, how could they do any better in explaining the puzzles of the evolution of consciousness? Even if one is willing
to dream up equations somehow trying to characterize a dynamical interaction between conscious states and familiar
material physical states, would they not necessarily work equally well if we relabelled painful states as pleasurable
and vice versa?
When an argument runs into such difficulties, one should question one’s premises. Perhaps the whole line of thinking
about consciousness we have set out is just misguided? Perhaps one of the other standard lines of thought [52] is more
promising after all? Well, perhaps. A review is beyond my scope here. But I’m not convinced: it seems to me they
also end up either falsely [53] denying any possibility of scientific progress on the hard problem or creating insoluble
puzzles of their own.
At the very least, it is clear from the literature that each position on consciousness finds thoughtful critics who
believe they can identify deep problems. If every line of thought runs into deep problems, one should arguably pursue
the one that offers most hope of bringing new data. I will now argue that the one I have set out does at least suggest
the possibility of experimental progress on the problem of consciousness, and with that, the possibility of saying at
least something more about how consciousness evolved. I don’t see how to take it far enough to sketch any plausible
conjecture about a satisfactory solution to the problem of pain and pleasure. Still, even a small chance of experimental
4progress is worth pursuing, especially given the huge implications. And if there is experimental progress, perhaps it
will bring conceptual and theoretical progress, in the new light of which these puzzles might seem less daunting.
People must, I imagine, once have thought it pointless to ask why stones always fall, birds sometimes fly, and clouds
generally float in the sky. Those were just part of the definition of stones, birds, and clouds. It must have seemed
useless to such people to speculate that we might be able to understand all this falling, flying and floating better if
stones, birds, clouds and everything else in the natural world turned out to be made up of smaller constituents. After
all, even if they were, it must have seemed that we would just be left asking essentially the same question: why do
stone-constituents fall (at least when assembled into stones) whereas bird-constituents sometimes fly (at least when
assembled into birds), and so on. In a sense, on this last point, they were right. Even now, we do still ask why the
laws of general relativity and quantum theory hold and not others. But even if the essence of the question is in some
sense still the same, its form has changed as our understanding developed, from an obstinate gatekeeper seemingly
preventing progress to a faithfully helpful guide along the long path to modern physics.
So, let us continue.
QUANTA AND QUALIA
Quantum theory and the brain
The hard problem of consciousness was a problem when we believed the world was described by classical physics.[54]
It may still be a problem if and when quantum theory and general relativity are superseded. There is no compelling
reason of principle to believe that quantum theory is the right theory in which to try to formulate a theory of
consciousness, or that the problems of quantum theory must have anything to do with the problem of consciousness.
That said, physics is where it is. Quantum theory is our best current fundamental theory. It works extremely
successfully in describing microscopic physics and some aspects of macroscopic physics. But it still has problems.
One is the long-standing problem of finding some description of objective reality consistent with quantum theory.[55]
Another is that we cannot rigorously define physically relevant field theories in four dimensions, even in Minkowski
space. And, of course, we do not know how to unify quantum theory and general relativity.
In summary, despite all quantum theory’s successes, there are still reasons to question whether it completely
describes all of physics. So, let us start by supposing that quantum theory applies pretty well to systems like human
brains. However, let us keep an open mind on whether it captures absolutely everything that physics can say about
them – since this has certainly not been well tested – and see where this takes us.
Qualia
According to one popular line of thought (see e.g. [4, 15, 16]) our consciousnesses can be thought of as composed
of very large numbers of individual sensation-components, or qualia. The analogy here is with (what was once) the
atomic hypothesis: that matter, in all its rich variety, can be understood as composed of various types of elementary
objects, atoms, in various proportions and combinations. Modern chemistry eventually led to the classification of the
elements, and hence the elementary atoms, and to the postulated understanding of (macroscopic terrestrial) matter as
combinations of atoms. Similarly, one might think, visual perceptions can maybe be understood as some combination
of a finite number of colour and relationship qualia, emotions as combinations of finitely many elementary emotional
qualia, and so on.
There is absolutely no evidence in favour of this qualia-as-atoms-of-consciousness model. If consciousness is indeed
something that can be modelled in any scientifically familiar way, it could be as a field, or a manifold. It could also,
of course, be that there is some mathematical model that looks nothing like anything we have encountered in physics
so far. Still, if we are going to speculate about the relationship of consciousness to the rest of physics at all, we
need some language, and the qualia model gives a useful way of thinking about how a connection might be made.
So we will use it, while emphasizing that our tentative conclusions are meant to apply more generally. The same
fundamental questions arise whether consciousness is built from atomic qualia or described by some other quantities.
And, importantly, the same conclusions follow.
5Qualia from quantum states: a cartoon
Whatever our consciousnesses are, they are almost certainly not identical to the physical states that give complete
descriptions of our brains. Even on a classical description, the vast majority of the information encoded in a config-
uration space description of the brain’s physical state does not appear to be carried by the associated consciousness.
This is true even of the highly coarse grained descriptions that arise in a higher level neuroscientific model of the
brain. For example, we are not aware of whether or not neurons only involved in governing unconscious processes are
firing, nor are we aware of most of the complex sequences of firings that produce conscious images.
The brain contains roughly 1011 neurons, firing on average roughly 102 times per second, giving roughly 1013
discrete signals per second. At a finer physical level, it contains about 1026 atoms, and tracking their coordinates (in
a classical model) would require 1078 independent parameters. As far as we can measure it, the bit rate of information
needed to describe our conscious states of mind is far smaller than these numbers. For example, lexical decision tasks
may take us only of the order of 100 bits per second of information processing [17], not all of which is conscious.
The number of details we can attend to per second in visual images also appears relatively small in comparison. For
example, recognizing one object drawn from a class of ≈ 105 takes us of order 100ms [18].
Admittedly, we cannot be at all precise on this point without a precise description of the range of possible conscious
mind states. Perhaps our emotional spectra are far richer than we generally credit. Introspection cannot be precisely
calibrated. We cannot definitively refute the hypothesis that conscious mind states are described by more than 1013
binary parameters or even more than 1078 continuous parameters, nor that every neuron firing or even every atom
moving in the brain subtly modulates our conscious state. But these seem very unlikely: most of these parameters
seem to be irrelevant to describing consciousness, since most microscopic details of the brain’s structure and operation
do not seem to have conscious correlates. So I will take it as a reasonable working hypothesis that very many different
complete brain states appear to map to the same conscious mind state, and that we can reasonably model possible
human conscious mind states, as they evolve in time, by significantly fewer than 1013 discrete signals per second.[56]
If so, any physical theory of consciousness must involve, among other things, a great deal of data selection.
Perhaps we can model this as a data selection principle: some rule that maps the large amount of information
contained in a parametrised description of the complete physical state of the brain to a smaller amount of information
contained in a hypothetical parametrised description[57] of the contents of the associated conscious mind.
I am not sure that anyone currently has any compellingly plausible idea as to how this might work in any detail.[58]
Certainly I don’t. So let me instead give a cartoon: not an idea to be taken seriously, but an illustration of the sort
of thing that would count as a data selection principle. Suppose that nature has fixed a cubic lattice with a certain
scale L, where L is larger than a small molecule and maybe not much larger than a neuron.[59] Suppose that nature is
described by some version of quantum theory in which collapses are objectively defined localized events in space-time
– for example, some versions of Copenhagen quantum theory, or a dynamical collapse model. Suppose moreover that
this version of quantum theory allows us to define a wave function on any given spacelike hypersurface, from some
theory of the initial conditions. Suppose also that it allows us to define local density matrices in a spatial region by
tracing out from the wave function the degrees of freedom corresponding to other regions of a spacelike hypersurface
in the limiting case where that hypersurface tends to the past light cone of a region.[60] We then take the expectation
value of the mass density defined by the local density matrix describing the quantum state of matter within each
volume L3 cube as one component of a primitive physical ontology, which describes physical states to which conscious
mind states may be attached. We update these density matrices at each time interval L/c, supposing that nature has
also fixed a one-dimensional lattice in time.
We suppose further that conscious mind states are composed of combinations of elementary qualia, which supervene
on the physical ontology in a lawlike way. Specifically, we suppose there is some local rule according to which a quale
Qj is associated with the cube C at discrete time point T provided that the configuration of local density matrices
for nearby and recent cubes (within distance NL and within past time NL/c, for some number N > 1) satisfies
some property Pj(ρ1, . . . , ρM ). Here M ≈ 8N
4 is the number of nearby and recent cubes, ρi are the mass density
expectation values in these cubes, j ∈ J is an index over the possible types of quale (which we might perhaps take to
be finite), and the properties Pj are sets of mathematical constraints (which to simplify the cartoon we might take to
be exclusive, so that each cube is associated with at most one quale). If none of the constraints Pj hold, then there
is no quale associated with the given cube at the given time. The consciousness C(S) associated at any given time
with a system S to which these rules are applied is the collection of all the qualia defined at that time.
Within our cartoon, this rule is meant to be fundamental, not tailored to the specifics of human brains. It is
supposed to give us a general algorithm for identifying C(S) for any system S. So we really should extend the cartoon
to give some cartoon-level story about how we can tell whether qualia are part of the same consciousness or not.
6Perhaps we could do that by adding a second scale K, and saying that any pair of qualia separated by no more than
K cubes, at any given time, form part of the same consciousness, and that belonging to the same consciousness is a
transitive relation on qualia. In other words, a pair of qualia belong to different consciousnesses if and only if they
are not joined by a path through the qualia that takes no more than K cubes for each step.[61]
For anything like this to work, even at the cartoon level, one would have to find properties Pj that tend to be
correlated with specific conscious qualia when those properties apply to human brains and (perhaps) central nervous
systems, so that postulating that the qualia supervene on brain matter gives a good description of our conscious mind
states. The Pj should also not have the property that these supervenience postulates also imply additional qualia
from (at the very least) most of the matter surrounding our brains and central nervous systems: if they did, we
would not be able to speak of separate single consciousnesses associated with each brain. One would also need some
plausible description of elementary qualia j ∈ J . And then, much harder still, one would need that the Pj actually
produce the right sort of collections of qualia – corresponding to the sort of things we actually consciously experience
– for the enormous variety of brains and brain states for which we have experience (direct or reported). It does not
matter for the cartoon whether or not the Pj imply that things other than brains – modern computers, large rocks,
spiral nebulae – are also conscious.
Obviously, I am not suggesting any of this is actually possible. The aim of this sketch is not to speculate about an
actual theory of consciousness but just to give a concrete, albeit incredible, illustration that allows us to develop a
particular line of thought further. Whatever the fundamental physical theory of consciousness – if there is one – looks
like, I am pretty sure it does not resemble this cartoon. But suppose, just for the sake of the argument, that it were
possible to make the cartoon work. We would then have a theory of consciousness, including a classification of qualia
and a data selection principle. The description of the Pj would, we need to assume, be significantly simpler than just
a dictionary of all the brain states and corresponding conscious states that we can identify. (If it isn’t, then it doesn’t
produce a compressed description of the empirical data about consciousness, and so it doesn’t define a useful theory.)
In that sense, we would have a significantly better understanding of consciousness.[62]
However, our theory, as described, would be of consciousness as an epiphenomenon. It could possibly nonetheless
represent a very substantial advance in our understanding of consciousness, if it turned out to describe the rich
variety of our experiences from a simple set of principles Pj . But it could not explain how and why humans had
evolved to produce brains that just happen to produce conditions in which many Pj tend to apply, and in which
the corresponding qualia produce the sort of consciousnesses we have. So, on the anti-epiphenomenal view we have
outlined above, it could not be fundamentally correct: at best it might be a good approximation.
Improving the cartoon?
Any explanation of why humans and other animals evolved to become conscious has to run one of two ways.
One is that human evolution can be understood purely in terms of the familiar material laws of physics, and it is just
a nice property of consciousness that it resides in highly evolved creatures that are continually processing information
about their environments and acting on it. If one believes this is a satisfactory definition of, or a self-evident property
of, consciousness, one can be happy with this explanation. As noted above, I don’t, so I’m not.
The other is that familiar materialist explanations of evolution alone are not adequate and that something about
consciousness itself gives an extra evolutionary advantage. This needs an extra mechanism that implies that, in some
sense, conscious creatures tend to prevail in competition with unconscious ones. More than that, since a binary
division between conscious and unconscious creatures doesn’t give enough room for an evolutionary story, it needs to
imply, in some sense, that more conscious creatures tend to prevail in competion with less conscious ones.
Having (perhaps foolhardily!) chosen to reject the first type of explanation in this discussion, we have to try for the
second. We can translate “more (less) conscious” into “having more (fewer) qualia” in our cartoon. Then, fortunately
for our cartoon narrative, there is at least an available option, already explored in a different connection [19] as a
natural way of defining generalizations of quantum theory. According to our cartoon, we can (in principle) calculate
the probability Pq(D) of any distribution D of qualia, from quantum dynamics and the relevant measurement or
collapse postulate and from knowledge of the constraints defining the properties Pj . (The suffix q stands for quantum
here.) We can do this for any system S, or in principle (given a good enough quantum theory that incorporates gravity
and describes cosmology) for the entire universe. As noted, if our cartoon were actually correct, this calculation would
give the correct predictions for an epiphenomenal model of consciousness. But we can change the model, and make
it non-epiphenomenally dependent on quantum theory, if we postulate instead that the true probability distribution
Ptrue(D) of distributions of qualia is a modified version of Pq(D).
7For instance, following the ideas of Ref. [19], we could postulate that
Ptrue(D) = CPq(D)A(D) , (1)
where C is a constant that ensures the rescaled probabilities sum to 1 and A(D) is some weight factor that depends
only on properties of the qualia distribution D.[63] To be clear: if we take quantum theory as ultimately a theory for
predicting the experiences of observers, this means postulating that quantum theory is at least subtly incorrect. But
the deviation could be very small and subtle, if A(D) depends only slightly and subtly on D.
Now, if A(D) is chosen to favour, even very slightly, distributions with more qualia, we have the potential beginnings
of an explanation for the evolution of primate-level consciousness from primitive qualia. For such an explanation to
work, we need that the postulated properties Pj somehow just happen to involve relations among mass density
expectation values that are useful for, or naturally fit into the context of, the types of information processing that
animal brains carry out – gathering information correlated with their bodies and environments, computing relevant
features, and generating responses.[64]
But given that (big [65]) assumption, we can see that there would be selection pressure towards creatures whose
information processing capacities use such relations in their information processing systems, and then selection pressure
in favour of those whose systems generate more qualia.[66]
One can only make full sense of this cartoon theory as we have phrased it, with a postulate of the form (1), in a block
universe picture, since equation (1) defines the probability distribution for the complete configuration of all qualia
throughout space and time.[67] Block universe theories of this type are logically consistent, but they can have unusual
and counter-intuitive implications, including effects that appear to agents within the theory to be reverse causation
and spacelike signalling. They also do not generally reduce to equally simple theories applicable to subsystems
of the universe. For example, the behaviour of a conscious individual, or an finite ecosystem, cannot generally be
modelled using only its initial state and some simple analogue of Eqn. (1). There are nonetheless theoretical reasons to
consider some types of block universe theory, since they suggest possible solutions to the quantum measurement/reality
problem. [68] That said, like the earlier part of the cartoon, our block universe qualia cartoon theory is meant only
as an existence theorem, not a serious theoretical proposal.[69]
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Every line of thought on the relationship of consciousness to physics runs into deep trouble. Because of this, we are
inclined to place some (albeit weak) credence that the line of thought we have outlined may not be entirely orthogonal
to the truth, despite its own evident problems. We stress again that none of the details of our cartoons are meant
to be taken seriously. What we do take seriously, at a weak level of credence, is the suggestion that we could make
some progress on understanding the problem of the evolution of consciousness if we supposed that consciousnesses
alter (albeit perhaps very slightly and subtly) quantum probabilities. A further reason for taking this seriously (still
at a weak level of credence) is an aesthetic preference for theories in which fundamental quantities (here qualia and
quanta) genuinely interact, rather than one being purely dependent on the other. The same point was used to motivate
inventing and testing generalizations of quantum theory in a different context in Ref. [19].[70]
What are the implications? Broadly, to add some support to tests of quantum theory that involve conscious
observers. For example, perhaps this line of thought adds a little to the motivation for interferometry experiments
involving viruses [20], or ultimately bacteria or larger creatures.[71] Existing intuitions that such experiments might
be worthwhile are mostly based on the idea [21] that quantum collapse may be connected to, or even directly caused
by, consciousness. Chalmers and McQueen [22] have recently formulated a more precise version of this proposal,
invoking the hypothesis of Tononi and collaborators [23] that what they term integrated information could define a
measure of consciousness.[72] Our discussion gives another weak reason for speculating that the direct involvement of
conscious observers might possibly alter something relevant to interferometry and other experiments.
Our discussion perhaps also adds a little to the motivation for long range Bell experiments in which human observers
make (their best attempt at) free random choices of measurement outcomes, and observe the outcomes directly, with
separations large enough that the combined choice processes and observations on the two wings are spacelike separated.
This added motivation is presently weak, since we have given no specific motivation in this discussion for looking at
Bell experiments in particular. A perhaps stronger motivation comes from combining the hypotheses that wave
function collapse requires consciousness and that collapse results propagate causally in the future light cone. This
leads to a consistent theory, if one assumes either that measurements can never be precisely specified or that collapses
are never perfect projections, and implies a loophole (the so-called “collapse locality loophole”) in all Bell experiments
to date [24, 25].
8(It is worth parenthetically mentioning here that some [26, 27] have suggested that Bell experiments involving
conscious observers can also be motivated by some form of “free will” hypothesis. Discussions of free will in connection
with physics are, if anything, even more contentious than those of consciousness, and it is beyond my scope to try to
add to them here, beyond pointing readers to recent relevant work. Roughly speaking, as I understand it, the main
ideas are that (a) superdeterminism could explain the observed violation of Bell inequalities in Bell experiments to
date, (b) there are possible motivations for considering models in which superdeterminism applies to the material
world but not to the outcomes of freely made human decisions. One such motivation, discussed by Hardy [26] is some
form of dualism, in which human decisions have the effect of unpredictable interventions into the material world,
whose effects propagate into but not outside the future light cone of the decision point. On this view, it is possible
we might see different results in Bell experiments in which the measurements on the two wings arise from spacelike
separated free choices by observers. Retarded Bell inequalities formalising mathematically the hypothesis to be tested
were defined by Hardy [28]. An extended discussion is given in Ref. [26], where Hardy reviews the history of work and
ideas in this direction and sets out a detailed experimental proposal, while also noting problems with and arguments
against the relevant hypotheses. While Hardy expresses strong credence that Bell experiments will continue to give
standard results, he stresses the point, also made below, that the payoff of a surprising result is sufficiently large to
justify the experiments.
Arguments that free will should play a fundamental role in physics have also recently been made by Gisin [29].)
In the longer term, if and when quantum technology advances to the point that direct tests of quantum theory (not
necessarily interferometric tests) on macroscopic objects are possible, our discussion does give a clear motivation for
carrying them out on animals and humans.
To be clear, neither I nor (as far as I am aware) any author mentioned here insist or even predict that quantum
theory will be violated in any of these experiments. The arguments that consciousness might have a role in quantum
physics are admittedly problematic, even if the counterarguments also are. And most of the interesting theoretical
ideas about quantum theory over the last fifty years involve formulations in which observers play no special role.
But, to be provocatively quantitative, on the grounds that deep puzzles in physics have often led to big surprises
and that consensus views tend to be overconfident, I would still give credence of perhaps 15% that something specif-
ically to do with consciousness causes deviations from quantum theory, with perhaps 3% credence that this will be
experimentally detectable within the next fifty years. No doubt many physicists would give much lower figures. Still
– as the existential risk community in particular has emphasized (e.g. [30–32]) – if one assigns non-zero probabilities,
however small and uncertain, to events with large costs or benefits, one should pay close attention to the expectation
values. The potential benefits here include making some progress in understanding the relationship between physics
and consciousness. That would also offer some hope of getting data to guide us in the ethical questions we already
face (how rich are the consciousnesses of animals?) and those we likely will (are human-level AI programmes, or
human brain emulations?). It could also significantly change our understanding of the physics of computation, with
potentially large implications for the future of intelligence. Even if one has very weak levels of credence (say 0.01%)
for any current ideas on the physics of consciousness, it seems to me the large potential implications still suggest that
more work should be carried out on possible experiments on conscious or plausibly conscious observers, and their
possible theoretical motivations.
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[46] in both senses of the term
[47] Some might say this is the goal of physics.
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[48] Nor do we want to exclude this possibility.
[49] This remains true even if one believes that some properties of consciousness are necessarily beyond the possible scope of
physical explanation, so long as one accepts that there are at least some aspects that could be characterised by simpler
laws. For example, one might consistently believe there is no hope for a physical explanation of the nature of the sensory
experience of seeing red, and still hope for simpler laws characterising when a physical system is conscious, or conscious
of images, or even conscious of redness, and perhaps even for laws quantifying some information theoretic measures of
its consciousness. The history of physics encourages us to try to formulate mathematical descriptions for those aspects
of natural phenomena that appear as though they may allow this, even if other aspects presently resist description. For
example, investigating the biomechanics and neurology of animals was worthwhile even in an era where there seemed no
obvious prospect of understanding the nature or origin of life.
[50] Quite what sort of time-dependent story about C(S) should emerge for conscious spatially extended objects S is very
unclear. It seems as though C(S) should be associated with the worldtube of S rather than any fixed worldline, and then
it seems that neither proper time or any other single time parameter is adequate to characterise the dependence of C(S).
Given that our only empirical examples, our own consciousnesses, seem (?) to be associated with a single time parameter,
even though our brains occupy appreciable spatial regions, we have no real basis for speculating further about more general
possibilities. We thus tentatively file this under “questions that might one day be addressable if there is real progress on
a physical theory of consciousness”.
[51] Or else the laws of physics and the laws of epiphenomenal consciousness were apparently designed together to give us
the false and useless but pleasing sense of being in conscious control of our actions. I find it hard to take this possibility
seriously. Epiphenomenalism per se does have advocates [7, 12]. However, the relevant position here is stronger than
standard epiphenomenalism. It is that there are succinct physical laws and separate succinct laws describing how the
contents of consciousnesses are connected epiphenomenally to their material substrates, and that the second types of law
just happen to imply that consciousnesses have the sense of controlling evolutionarily relevant behaviour in evolutionarily
favourable ways, even though in fact all the relevant behaviour is already physically determined. Since almost all succinct
epiphenomenal laws that one could imagine do not have this property, and all of them are equally logically consistent, this
seems to me entirely implausible.
It is worth adding here that even a very slight causal effect of consciousness on the material world – if we could make sense
of such a hypothesis – could allow the possibility of countering this specific objection. This is not because it would make
it true that we are in conscious control of our actions in the pleasing but naive way that we tend to intuit: a very small
effect would presumably not make much difference to this. However, it might leave room for an explanation of how the
sense of conscious control and the associated causal physical mechanisms could have co-evolved, over the history of life on
Earth, through the slow accumulation of small effects.
[52] See the references cited above for discussions.
[53] I claim “falsely” is a statement of fact, not opinion. Whether they are right or wrong, the sort of ideas sketched in this
paper show that there could be a testable scientific theory of consciousness.
[54] This is meant as an intellectual point, not a historical statement about discussions of consciousness. The term “hard
problem” was coined by Chalmers in 1995 [4, 8]. Many earlier discussions of the mind-body problem cover some of the
same ground as Chalmers; the intellectual history is reviewed in Ref. [4] and the other general references cited earlier.
However, regardless of how precisely it was recognised, by whom, or when, the problem existed in the era of classical
physics. To put it another way, if we believed today that the world were described by classical physics, we should still
be discussing the hard problem. It is possible that quantum theory may ultimately shed new light on consciousness, or
vice versa. It is even possible that at a fundamental level the formulation of quantum theory might turn out to require
consciousness as a physical primitive. But it is not the case that quantum theory introduced the hard problem into physics.
[55] Of course, this too is keenly debated. For some reviews and discussions, see for example Refs. [33–36].
[56] Precise measures of information would need a probability distribution on the set of possible states. In principle, we could
get some probability distribution on human brain states from neuroscientific models derived from observational data in
typical environments. We could also get an upper bound on the information contained in conscious mind states, if the set
of such states is finite, by assuming they are equiprobable.
[57] We give a cartoon of such a description below just to illustrate one way to begin thinking about possibilities.
[58] Some noteworthy discussions of the relationship between consciousness and physics include Refs. [23, 37–39].
[59] Any readers who want to pay this crude cartoon the honour of worrying about its consistency with special relativity could
imagine that this story works only where large enough local collections of matter define a local inertial frame to a good
enough approximation. We could then replace the assumption of a global lattice with a patchwork of local lattices, locally
defined in the relevant inertial frames. To extend the cartoon a bit further we could (for example) add the rule that if
there is no such frame, then there are no qualia, and no local consciousness.
[60] For example, in Copenhagen quantum theory, this construction means that the effects of measurements inside the past
light cone are taken into account in constructing the local density matrix, while those outside the past light cone are not.
[61] The so-called combination problem [40], first raised by William James [41], is widely thought to be an obstacle to any
satisfactory theory of consciousness involving novel rules attaching elements of consciousness to simple physical system.
Chalmers [42] has argued that the combination problem has several aspects. If one thinks of this cartoon as a sort of
panprotopsychist model, the rule that transitively connects qualia separated by no more than K cubes illustrates that
panprotopsychist laws (at least at cartoon level) can deal with what Chalmers calls the subject combination problem.
Other aspects, especially the quality combination problem, remain problematic.
[62] This is not to say we would have solved the existing puzzles concerning the relationship of consciousness and physics.
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Indeed, a theory of this type would raise new puzzles: for example, why the lawlike supervenience of qualia on a quantum-
derived ontology takes this particular form. Nonetheless, we would be able to make predictions we cannot presently make
about the conscious mind states associated with brain states. We could also test them, insofar as any predictions about
conscious states are testable, by adding the assumption that conscious states are often reliably reported. That is, we
could see whether the predicted conscious mind states agree with our descriptions of our own mind states and with the
descriptions others give of theirs.
[63] This is not the most general possibility, but general enough for the present discussion.
[64] “Information” here is meant in the slightly informal sense standardly used in discussing biological intelligence. It is very
hard to quantify precisely the information in an animal’s environment, or its representation of that environment, or its
behavioural responses. Nonetheless it is generally agreed that relatively simple information-theoretic models give us good
analogies, and widely expected that the analogies could in principle be made to approach representations of reality more
and more closely as more complexity is introduced. Underlying this expectation is the assumption – with which most
neuroscientists and physicists are very comfortable – that the known laws of physics completely describe animal behaviour.
[65] Though it is a very big assumption to make, it is still much less contrived than the dogmatic assumption that we must
have consciousnesses of exactly the sort we have, given the information processing that we do.
[66] Stretching credulity even further, if A(D) were somehow chosen to favour qualia of particular types (which tend to be
“pleasant”) and disfavour qualia of other types (which tend to be “painful”), we might also have at least the potential
beginning of a story about how creatures came to embed in their information processing systems some subsystems that
generate pleasant qualia (which are favoured by our hypothetical postulate, and which are located so that they correspond
to evolutionarily favourable activities) and some that generate painful qualia (which are disfavoured, and located so that
they correspond to unfavourable activities). But our comments earlier apply: there seems no reason why this would not
equally well work for evolution – although not so happily for us, its conscious products – with the pleasure-pain polarities
reversed. The best I can offer is the thought that that the pleasure-pain problem might somehow look different and less
fundamentally threatening if we understood the actual details of the interaction between material states and conscious
states. But we don’t have a theory of consciousness, and so I don’t see how this could work. Maybe, of course, it just
doesn’t: maybe the pleasure-pain problem actually is insoluble in this approach, or perhaps in any approach.
[67] This leaves us with the problem of the psychological perception of time, since those qualia must nonetheless give conscious
creatures the impression of a flow of time associated with a succession of experiences. But this is a deep problem in any view
of consciousness and physics. It also, of course, leaves us with the usual gap between standard language and fundamental
ontology in talking about processes within a block universe. For example, “the evolution of primate-level consciousness”
is shorthand for something like “the sequential appearance of low-level, increasingly more complex, and primate-level
consciousnesses at increasing cosmological times measured from the presumably highly ordered singularity conventionally
referred to as the beginning of the universe”.
[68] One line of thought on this can be found in Refs. [43, 44]; see also references therein for other discussions.
[69] Among the very odd features of the block universe rule (1), as stated, is that it implies that the bias towards consciousness
in evolutionary selection arises from a calculation that depends on the global distribution of consciousness in space and
time. For example, the weight bias between alternatives that would produce either descendent d1 or d2, with differing
numbers of lifetime qualia does not in general reduce to a ratio of the weights associated with the qualia they produce over
their lifetimes, A(C(d1))/A(C(d2)). It does not even reduce to a ratio of the form A(T1)/A(T2), defined by the weights
associated with the qualia their entire trees of descendents Ti produce. One has also to consider the effects of T1 and T2 on
other future conscious lifeforms and evaluate the ratio of weights A(D1)/A(D2) associated with the full qualia distributions
Di over all future space-time arising if di is the descendent. A version of the rule in which the weight function A is chosen
so that A(D1)/A(D2) = A(C(d1))/A(C(d2)) would probably improve the cartoon somewhat.
[70] There are interesting parallels between the beable hypothesis [45] and the qualia hypothesis. Bell’s notion of beable – a
mathematical quantity in a physical theory that directly corresponds to an element of physical reality – is intended to
give a language to highlight a general class of possible solutions to the quantum reality problem: what, precisely, could
be the sample space for which we calculate probabilities for a closed quantum system? Similarly, the notion of qualia
identifies hypothetical elementary quantities that could be characterised by a theory of consciousness that addresses the
hard problem. In both cases, whether the relevant problem really is a problem is controversial, with thoughtful people on
both sides. For those who think both problems are real and may lead to new science, parsimony might suggest that qualia
can be understood in terms of – perhaps as functions of – beables. A more radical option would be to identify beables and
qualia, which would imply that quantum theory is ultimately about conscious perceptions (though not necessarily only
those of familiar living creatures).
[71] Among the further uncertainties here are that it is far from clear why we should expect viruses or bacteria to have any
sort of consciousness.
[72] To the best of my knowledge there is currently no empirical evidence for the integrated information hypothesis, and its
plausibility is debated. However, Chalmers and McQueen’s point applies quite generally. Any well-defined measure of
consciousness would allow a more precise formulation of Wigner’s idea and hence an analysis of whether experimental tests
could be feasible in the forseeable future.
